To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff "must establish that: (1) he participated in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) his employer took an adverse employment action against him; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556-57 (5th Cir. 2007). Pursuant to the framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), "[i]f the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to state a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its decision. After the employer states its reason, the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the employer's reason is actually a pretext for retaliation." LeMaire v. La. Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 388-89 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted). Hague v. University of Texas Health Science Center At San Antonio, (5th Cir. 2014)
The Supreme Court clarified the term "adverse employment action" in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). Prior to Burlington, this court took a relatively restrictive approach to the phrase, holding that an adverse employment action occurred only where there were "tangible change[s] in duties or working conditions that constituted a material employment disadvantage." Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., Inc., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir.1997). In its Burlington Northern decision, the Court characterized our standard as the "ultimate employment decision" standard, limiting retaliatory conduct to acts like "hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating." 548 U.S. at 60, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (quotations, alterations, and citations omitted). The Burlington Northern Court articulated a new objective standard for determining what constitutes an "adverse employment action." Id. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405. The Court held that an employee demonstrating an adverse employment action must "show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." Id. at 67, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (quotations and citations omitted); see also Lisdahl v. Mayo Found., 633 F.3d 712, 720 (8th Cir. 2011). Aubuchon v. Geithner, 743 F. 3d 638 (8th Cir. 2014)
THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of 30 U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that evaluate allegations of employer retaliation in violation of the civil rights of employees. The selection of decisions spans from January 2013 to the date of publication.