"Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination." Id. Once this burden is met, the defendant must then "articulate 'some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' for its action." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reason[ ]. It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff." Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (citation omitted). When the employer meets its burden, "the plaintiff can no longer rely on the prima facie case," Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 106, but "must prove that the employer's proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination," McPherson v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir.2006). Delaney v. Bank of America Corp., 766 F. 3d 163 (2nd Cir. 2014).
Wrongful termination claims are [ ] evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas framework. To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he, "(1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified for the position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some adverse employment action by the employer; and (4) was replaced by someone outside his protected group or was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the protected group." Id. Under the fourth prong's "similarly situated employees" requirement, a plaintiff must show that he was treated less favorably than others "under nearly identical circumstances." Love v. Kan. City S. Ry., 574 F.3d 253, 259-60 (5th Cir.2009). Once a prima facie case is established, the defendant can offer a non-discriminatory reason for the termination, which may then be rebutted by the plaintiff as pretext. Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F. 3d 314 (5th Cir. 2014).
[The plaintiff] must provide "either direct evidence of discrimination or create an inference of it under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework" to defeat the defendants' motion for summary judgment on his retaliation claim. Young-Losee v. Graphic Packaging Int'l, Inc., 631 F.3d 909, 912 (8th Cir.2011) (citation omitted); see also Stewart v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 196, 481 F.3d 1034, 1042-43 (8th Cir.2007) ("Without direct evidence of a retaliatory motive, we analyze retaliation claims (whether under Title VII, the ADA, or the ADEA), under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)."). Lors v. Dean, 746 F. 3d 857 (8th Cir. 2014).
"Direct evidence of retaliation is evidence that demonstrates a specific link between a materially adverse action and the protected conduct, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that the harmful adverse-action was in retaliation for the protected conduct." Young-Losee, 631 F.3d at 912 (citation omitted). By "direct" evidence, we mean "the causal strength of the proof, not whether it is 'circumstantial' evidence." Id. (quoting Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir.2004)). Lors v. Dean, ibid.
Under the indirect method, plaintiffs must first make out a prima facie case of discrimination, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), which has four elements: they must demonstrate that (1) they are members of a protected class; (2) they were meeting their employer's legitimate expectations; (3) they suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) at least one similarly situated employee, not in their protected class, was treated more favorably. Rodgers v. White, 657 F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir.2011). If the plaintiffs establish a prima facie case, then "the burden shifts to [the employer] to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [the adverse employment action] which if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action." Petts v. Rockledge Furniture, LLC, 534 F.3d 715, 725 (7th Cir.2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If [the employer] meets this burden, the burden returns to the plaintiffs to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the proffered reason is a pretext for race discrimination. Id. While the indirect approach is often called a "burden shifting" method, "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff[s] remains at all times with the plaintiff[s]." Contreras v. Suncast Corp., 237 F.3d 756, 760 (7th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F. 3d 972 (7th Cir. 2014).
THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of 42 U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze and interpret the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. The selection of decisions spans from 2012 to the date of publication.