The Speedy Trial Act requires trial to "commence within seventy days from the filing date . . . of the information or indictment." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). If a defendant is absent on the trial date and a "subsequent appearance before the court on a bench warrant or other process . . . occurs more than 21 days after the day set for trial," the 70-day clock begins to run anew at the subsequent appearance. Id. § 3161(k)(1). US v. Rice, (9th Cir. 2015).
The Act establishes a general rule: if a court does not bring a defendant to trial within seventy days after indictment or arraignment, the court "shall" dismiss the indictment on "motion of the defendant." 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The Act, however, "exclude[s]" from its seventy-day limit certain periods of pretrial delay. Id. § 3161(h). The time a trial court takes to decide a "pretrial motion," for example, does not count toward the seventy-day limit. Id. § 3161(h)(1)(D). If the court holds a hearing on a motion, the Act excludes the time between the filing of the motion and the conclusion of the hearing. United States v. Van Smith, 530 F.3d 967, 969 (D.C. Cir. 2008). US v. Taplet, (DC Cir. 2015).
The Supreme Court has identified four factors that must be balanced when evaluating speedy trial claims: (1) length of the delay, (2) reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's diligence in asserting his rights, and (4) prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). [T]he first three Barker factors must be weighed together against the last factor, prejudice. United States v. Serna-Villarreal, 352 F.3d 225, 230 (5th Cir. 2003). "Obviously, in this balancing, the less prejudice a defendant experiences, the less likely it is that a denial of a speedy trial right will be found." Id. And, "[o]rdinarily, the burden of demonstrating such prejudice rests on the defendant." Id. (citation omitted). Cox v. Stephens, (5th Cir. 2015).
Barker established a four-factor test for evaluating whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. The inquiry focuses on: (1) the length of the delay before trial; (2) the reason for the delay and, specifically, whether the government or the defendant is more to blame; (3) the extent to which the defendant asserted his speedy trial right; and (4) the prejudice suffered by the defendant. 407 U.S. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. 2182. "[N]o one factor is dispositive nor 'talismanic.'" Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 770 (3d Cir.1993) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182). US v. Velazquez, 749 F. 3d 161 (3rd Cir. 2014).
Th[e] statute requires that a defendant be brought to trial within 70 days of the date of indictment, the date the indictment was unsealed, or the date of the initial appearance, whichever date occurs last. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Nevertheless, the Act carves out a number of exclusions that can toll the running of the 70-day period. These excludable periods include "[a]ny period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant," "any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the defendant or an essential witness," and any period of delay resulting from a continuance "granted by any judge on his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the Government." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1), (3)(A), (7)(A). US v. Williams, 753 F. 3d 626 (6th Cir. 2014).
In order to stop the speedy-trial clock, however, a continuance must be based on a court's "findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). When determining whether the ends of justice outweigh the public and defendant's interests in a speedy trial, the Act requires the district court to consider several factors, including "[w]hether the failure to grant such a continuance ... would be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice" and "[w]hether the failure to grant such a continuance in a case ... would deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the Government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i), (iv). It also requires a court to "set[] forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). US v. Williams, ibid.
[U]nder the Speedy Trial Act a court must detail its reasons for finding that the ends of justice outweigh the best interests of the defendant and the public in a speedy trial and must do so at least by the time it rules on a defendant's motion to dismiss under the Act. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 506-07, 126 S.Ct. 1976, 164 L.Ed.2d 749 (2006). Ideally, a court should provide these reasons "at or near the time it grants the continuance." Id. at 507 n. 7, 126 S.Ct. 1976 (noting that this is the "best practice"). US v. Williams, ibid.
THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of 44 U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze and interpret the constitutional right to a speedy trial. The selection of decisions spans from 2012 to the date of publication.