ERISA "supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Despite the simplicity of the statutory text, "ERISA pre-emption questions are recurrent," reflecting "the comprehensive nature of the statute, the centrality of pension and welfare plans in the national economy, and their importance to the financial security of the Nation's work force." Boggs, 520 U.S. at 839. But in Boggs v. Boggs, the Supreme Court helpfully narrowed the ERISA preemption inquiry. Under Boggs, rather than examine conflicts between state law and ERISA's text, we may "simply ask[] if state law conflicts with the provisions of ERISA or operates to frustrate its objects." Id. at 841. And as instructed by the Court in Hillman v. Maretta, in order to answer that question, "we must first ascertain the nature of the federal interest." 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1950 (2013). Vanderkam v. Vanderkam, (DC Cir. 2015).
The Supreme Court has found that a state law relates to an ERISA plan "if it has a connection with or reference to such plan," id. at 147, 121 S.Ct. 1322 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2900, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983)), but "cautioned against an 'uncritical literalism' that would make pre-emption turn on 'infinite connections.'" Id. (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656, 115 S.Ct. at 1677). "[T]o determine whether a state law has the forbidden connection, we look both to 'the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive,' as well as to the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans." Id. (quoting Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325, 117 S.Ct. 832, 838, 136 L.Ed.2d 791 (1997)). America's Health Ins. Plans v. Hudgens, 742 F. 3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2014).
[ERISA's] broad statutory preemption is restricted by the "Saving Clause," which provides that "nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). The "Deemer Clause" then acts as an exception to the Saving Clause, providing that an ERISA employee benefit plan "shall [not] be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer,... or to be engaged in the business of insurance ... for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies [or] insurance contracts." Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B). America's Health Ins. Plans v. Hudgens, ibid.
Thus, in determining whether a challenged law is expressly preempted under Section 514 of ERISA, we first look to whether it "relates to" employee benefit plans. If it does not, the law is not preempted. If it does "relate to" employee benefit plans, we then turn to whether the law is "saved" by the Saving Clause. If saved, we must determine whether the Deemer Clause applies. If the Deemer Clause applies, then the Saving Clause does not serve to protect the law from preemption. America's Health Ins. Plans v. Hudgens, ibid.
THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of 31 U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze and discuss ERISA preemption of state law. The selection of decisions spans from 2011 to the date of publication.