A cause of action for promissory estoppel requires: (1) a promise by the defendant; (2) foreseeable and actual reliance on the promise by the plaintiff to his detriment; and (3) that enforcement of the promise be necessary to avoid an injustice. See "Moore" Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. 1972); Ford v. City State Bank of Palacios, 44 S.W.3d 121, 139 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). "To support a finding of promissory estoppel, the asserted promise must be sufficiently specific and definite that it would be reasonable and justified for the promisee to rely upon it as a commitment to future action." Comiskey v. FH Partners, LLC, 373 S.W.3d 620, 635 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (internal quotation marks omitted). Guajardo v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, (5th Cir. 2015).
"The function of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is ... defensive in that it estops a promisor from denying the enforceability of the promise." Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex.1965). In sum, "[w]here a promisee acts to his detriment in reasonable reliance upon an otherwise unenforceable promise, ... the disappointed party may have a substantial and compelling claim for relief.... 'A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.'" Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90); see also, e.g., Fretz, 626 S.W.2d at 480 (quoting and applying Restatement test for promissory estoppel). The burden of proving all the essential elements of promissory estoppel is on the party asserting the doctrine. Concord Oil Co. v. Alco Oil & Gas Corp., 387 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex.1965). "In a claim for promissory estoppel, only reliance damages are allowed." Cent. Tex. Micrographics v. Leal, 908 S.W.2d 292, 298 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ) (citing Fretz, 626 S.W.2d at 483). Reliance damages seek to put the injured party in the position that he or she would have been in had he not relied on the promise. See Fretz, 626 S.W.2d at 478. Such damages "includ[e] expenditures made in preparation for performance or in performance, less any loss that the party in breach can prove with reasonable certainty the injured party would have suffered had the contract been performed." Hart v. Moore, 952 S.W.2d 90, 97 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, pet. denied). Metroplexcore, LLC v. Parsons Transp., Inc., 743 F. 3d 964 (5th Cir. 2014).
In Florida, the doctrine of promissory estoppel "applies when there is (1) a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance, (2) action or forbearance in reliance on the promise, and (3) injustice resulting if the promise is not enforced." DK Arena, Inc. v. EB Acquisitions I, LLC, 112 So.3d 85, 96 (Fla.2013). Florida law also provides "the judicial doctrine of promissory estoppel may not be used to circumvent" the Statute of Frauds. Id. at 97. Bloch v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 755 F. 3d 886 (11th Cir. 2014).
Under Missouri law, "[a] claim of promissory estoppel has four elements: (1) a promise; (2) on which a party relies to his or her detriment; (3) in a way the promisor expected or should have expected; and (4) resulting in an injustice that only enforcement of the promise could cure." Clevenger v. Oliver Ins. Agency, Inc., 237 S.W.3d 588, 590 (Mo.2007) (en banc). Furthermore,
[a] promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specific way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made. A promise is the promisor's expression of an intention to bring about a specified result in the future. The promise must be definite and made in a contractual sense. A supposed promise that is wholly illusory or a mere expression of intention, hope, desire, or opinion, which shows no real commitment, cannot be expected to induce reliance.City of St. Joseph, Mo. v. Sw. Bell Tel., 439 F.3d 468, 477 (8th Cir.2006) (quotations and citations omitted) (applying Missouri law). "In Missouri, ... it is required that a promise be as definite and delineated as an offer under contract law." Prenger v. Baumhoer, 939 S.W.2d 23, 27 n. 4 (Mo.Ct. App.1997). Freitas v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 703 F. 3d 436 (8th Cir. 2013).
THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of 43 U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze, interpret and apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The selection of decisions spans from 2010 to the date of publication.