The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from "deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause does not require identical treatment; rather, it "guarantees that the government will not classify individuals on the basis of impermissible criteria." Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir.1997). Seeboth v. Allenby, 789 F. 3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2015).
"The [Fourteenth Amendment's] Equal Protection Clause protects an individual from being treated differently, not simply wrongly, by the government." Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 543 n. 15 (4th Cir.2013). Although that particular clause does not apply directly to the federal government, the "approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth[.]" Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n. 2, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975). US v. Surratt, 797 F. 3d 240 (4th Cir. 2015). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that "the equal protection obligations imposed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments [are] indistinguishable." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217 (1995). Stop Reckless Economic Instability Caused by Democrats v. Federal Election Commission, (4th Cir. 2016).
"The Equal Protection Clause contemplates that similarly situated persons are to receive substantially similar treatment from their government." Tapalian v. Tusino, 377 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2004) (citation omitted). To establish an equal protection claim, a plaintiff needs to allege facts showing that "(1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person." Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 910 (1st Cir.1995) (quoting Yerardi's Moody St. Restaurant & Lounge, Inc. v. Bd. of Selectmen, 878 F.2d 16, 21 (1st Cir.1989)). Davis v. Coakley, 802 F. 3d 128 (1st Cir. 2015).
An individual is "similarly situated" to others for equal protection purposes when "a prudent person, looking objectively at the incidents, would think them roughly equivalent and the protagonists similarly situated." Barrington Cove Ltd. P'ship v. Rhode Island Hous. & Mortgage Fin. Corp., 246 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2001) (quoting Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir.1989)). Davis v. Coakley, ibid.
In order to prove an Equal Protection violation, plaintiffs must establish that, compared with other similarly situated individuals, they were "selectively treated ... based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person." See id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 910 (1st Cir.1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Aponte-Ramos v. Álvarez-Rubio, 783 F. 3d 905 (1st Cir. 2015).
"The formula for determining whether individuals or entities are similarly situated ... is not always susceptible to precise demarcation. The line between sufficient facts and insufficient conclusions is often blurred." Barrington Cove, 246 F.3d at 8 (alterations, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, the standard "is whether a prudent person, looking objectively at the incidents, would think them roughly equivalent and the protagonists similarly situated." Id. (quoting Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir.1989), overruled on other grounds by Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernández, 367 F.3d 61, 64 (1st Cir.2004)). Mulero-Carrillo v. Román-Hernández, 790 F. 3d 99 (1st Cir. 2015).
The cases must be similar "in all relevant respects": "[e]xact correlation is neither likely nor necessary, but the cases must be fair congeners. In other words, apples should be compared to apples." Id. (quoting Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d at 19) (internal quotation marks omitted). Aponte-Ramos v. Álvarez-Rubio, 783 F. 3d 905 (1st Cir. 2015). ("The comparison cases need not be perfect replicas.... [But,] in offering ... comparative evidence, [a plaintiff] bears the burden of showing that the individuals with whom he seeks to be compared have been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct....") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Mulero-Carrillo v. Román-Hernández, bid.
To establish a successful class-of-one equal protection claim, [the plaintiff] must show that she was "intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment." Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000). Further, to be "similarly situated," she and her comparators must be "prima facie identical in all relevant respects or directly comparable... in all material respects." United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir.2008) (quoting Racine Charter One, Inc. v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 424 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir.2005)) (internal quotation marks excluded). Although the question of whether individuals are similarly situated is a question of fact for the jury to decide, "a court may properly grant summary judgment where it is clear that no reasonable jury could find that the similarly situated requirement has been met." McDonald v. Vill. of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1002 (7th Cir.2004). DS v. East Porter County School Corp., 799 F. 3d 793 (7th Cir. 2015).
To state a class-of-one claim, the "'plaintiff must . . . provide a specific and detailed account of the nature of the preferred treatment of the favored class, especially when the state actors exercise broad discretion to balance a number of legitimate considerations.'" Robbins v. Becker, 794 F.3d 988, 996 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Nolan v. Thompson, 521 F.3d 983, 990 (8th Cir. 2008)). Higgins Electric, Inc. v. O'Fallon Fire Protection District, (8th Cir. 2016).
Furthermore, "a class-of-one claim does not extend to cases where the rules are uniformly applicable and a state official exercises his 'discretionary authority based on subjective, individualized determinations.'" Novotny v. Tripp County, 664 F.3d 1173, 1179 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008)); cf. Corey Airport Servs., Inc. v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 682 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (observing, "Every government-run bid process" "involves winners and losers: selection of a winner inherently involves a kind of discrimination in itself"). [Where the defendant explicitly reserved the right to award the contract "in [its] best interest," and "to select a Bidder other than the lowest," plaintiff did not state an equal protection claim.] Higgins Electric, Inc. v. O'Fallon Fire Protection District, ibid.
"To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination." Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001). "Once this showing is made, the court proceeds to determine whether the disparity in treatment can be justified under the requisite level of scrutiny." Id. Stop Reckless Economic Instability Caused by Democrats v. Federal Election Commission, ibid.
Because "legislative classifications as a general rule are presumptively valid under the Equal Protection Clause," [courts] ordinarily [ ] uphold a legislative classification if it is "'rationally related to a legitimate state interest.'" Id. (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985)). Seeboth v. Allenby, ibid.
Certain exceptions to that general rule trigger heightened judicial scrutiny. If the classification targets a suspect class or burdens the exercise of a fundamental right, we apply strict scrutiny and ask whether the statute is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Wright v. Incline Vill. Gen. Improvement Dist., 665 F.3d 1128, 1141 (9th Cir.2011). If a law discriminates against a quasi-suspect class, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny; to survive a constitutional challenge, such discrimination must substantially relate to an important governmental objective. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 479-80 (9th Cir.2014), petitions for cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3589 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2014) (No. 14-765), (U.S. Jan. 2, 2015) (No. 14-788), and (U.S. Apr. 9, 2015) (No. 141214). Seeboth v. Allenby, ibid.
The government violates equal protection when it intentionally discriminates against an individual based on race, national origin, or gender. See Berkley v. United States, 287 F.3d 1076, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2002). A facially neutral law or regulation can violate equal protection "if it was motivated by discriminatory animus and its application results in discriminatory effect." Id. If petitioners establish that the government engaged in intentional discrimination, then the government "must demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive justification" for the discrimination. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). Service Women's Action Network v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, (Fed. Cir. 2016).
("The right to 'make a living' is not a 'fundamental right,' for either equal protection or substantive due process purposes." (quoting N.Y. State Trawlers Ass'n v. Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303, 1309-12 (2d Cir.1994))). Therefore, [such a] claim is within an area of social and economic policy, where a legislative "classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against [an] equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993). Mulero-Carrillo v. Román-Hernández, ibid.
THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of 195 U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that discuss, analyze and interpret the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The selection of decisions spans from 2004 to the date of publication.