Generally, a government entity is not liable for its employee's actions under § 1983. Brockinton v. City of Sherwood, Ark., 503 F.3d 667, 674 (8th Cir.2007). But a plaintiff can pursue a Monell claim under § 1983 by identifying a government entity's policy or custom that caused the plaintiff's injury. Id. Keefe v. City of Minneapolis, 785 F. 3d 1216 (8th Cir. 2015).
The "touchstone of [a] § 1983 action against a government body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a deprivation of civil rights protected by the Constitution." Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Hoefling v. City of Miami, (11th Cir. 2016).
Holding [a county liable] "requires proof of three elements: a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose 'moving force' is the policy or custom." Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). This type of municipal liability— known as Monell liability after the case that first recognized it—is difficult to prove. This difficulty arises because, unlike private companies, municipalities are not liable for negligent actions their employees take. Instead, they are liable only if the policymakers themselves were involved in the unconstitutional acts. This difficulty reflects an intentional congressional choice to limit the scope of municipal liability. Anderson v. Marshall County, (5th Cir. 2016).
"The 'official policy' requirement was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible." Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (emphasis in original). A plaintiff may show that the municipality was responsible in four ways: "(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations." Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir.2013). Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F. 3d 526 (6th Cir. 2015).
Typically, a municipality is immune from § 1983 liability, unless it can be shown that the unconstitutional actions it is charged with committing is the result of a municipal policy or custom. Paterek v. Village of Armada, Michigan, ibid. There are, however, several different ways of establishing municipal liability under § 1983. A municipality can be liable for an official policy enacted by its legislative body (e.g., an ordinance or resolution passed by a city council). See Monell, 436 U.S. at 661, 694-95; McCusik v. City of Melbourne, 96 F.3d 478, 483 (11th Cir. 1996). Municipal liability may also attach if final policymakers have acquiesced in a longstanding practice that constitutes the entity's standard operating procedure. See Bd. of Cty. Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997); Brown v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481 n. 11 (11th Cir. 1991). And a municipality can be held liable "on the basis of ratification when a subordinate public official makes an unconstitutional decision and when that decision is then adopted by someone who does have final policymaking authority." Matthews v. Columbia County, 294 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2002). So not all theories of municipal liability under § 1983 require (or depend on) a single final policymaker. Hoefling v. City of Miami, ibid.
The phrase policy or custom is not so limited — Monell (and municipal liability) "[are] ... about responsibility," not merely written rules of conduct. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). Therefore, an isolated exercise of government authority that abridges an individual's constitutional rights can give rise to municipal liability. Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 14 F.3d 1115, 1117-18 (6th Cir.1994). For example, liability can be established by showing that "an official with final decision making authority ratified [the] illegal actions." Id. Paterek v. Village of Armada, Michigan, 801 F. 3d 630 (6th Cir. 2015).
In order to state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating that the defendants violated a constitutional right either "pursuant to official municipal policy" or as part of "a custom or usage with the force of law." Ware v. Jackson Cty., Mo., 150 F.3d 873, 880 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Misconduct among a municipality's employees must be "continuing, widespread, [and] persistent" to establish such a custom. Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir. 1999). In addition, the municipality will not be liable unless policymaking officials exhibit "[d]eliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct . . . after notice to the officials of that misconduct." Id. Kelly v. City of Omaha, (8th Cir. 2016).
A suit against a public official in his official capacity is a suit against the government entity. Surprenant, 424 F.3d at 19; Wood v. Hancock Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 354 F.3d 57, 58 n. 1 (1st Cir.2003). The reason for this rule is that "it is when [the] execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983." Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018; see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)("[W]here action is directed by those who establish governmental policy, the municipality is equally responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly."). [A] municipal government is liable when it has caused the deprivation of a constitutional right through an official policy or custom. See Rodríguez v. Municipality of San Juan, 659 F.3d 168, 181 (1st Cir.2011). "One way of establishing a policy or custom is by showing that 'a person with final policy making authority' caused the supposed constitutional injury." Id. (quoting Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 941-42 (1st Cir.2008)). Liability may be imposed on a municipality for a single decision by a final policy maker. Rodríguez-García v. Miranda-Marín, 610 F.3d 756, 770 (1st Cir.2010). Rosaura Bldg. Corp. v. Municipality of Mayaguez, 778 F. 3d 55 (1st Cir. 2015).
A municipality's liability is "based on causation rather than respondeat superior." Bolton v. City of Dallas, Tex., 541 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir.2008) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692, 98 S.Ct. 2018). "Consequently, the unconstitutional conduct must be directly attributable to the municipality through some sort of official action or imprimatur; isolated unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger liability." Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578 (citations and footnotes omitted). Culbertson v. Lykos, 790 F. 3d 608 (5th Cir. 2015).
Municipalities may be held directly liable for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but they "cannot be held liable ... on a respondeat superior theory." Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018. "Rather, ... a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 [must] identify a municipal policy or custom that caused the plaintiff's injury." Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1232-33 (9th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A] custom or practice can be inferred from ... evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officers were not discharged or reprimanded." Id. at 1233 (internal quotation marks omitted). Evidence of "identical incident[s]" to that alleged by the plaintiff may establish that a municipality was put on notice of its agents' unconstitutional actions, Henry v. Cnty. of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 518-21 (9th Cir.1997), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir.1998). . . . Velazquez v. City of Long Beach, 793 F. 3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2015).
[W]here a plaintiff alleges that a lack of a policy caused a constitutional violation, she must produce "more evidence than a single incident to establish liability." Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822-23 (1985)). She must produce evidence of a "series of incidents" (Hahn v. Walsh, 762 F.3d 617, 638 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1419 (2015)), or a "widespread practice constituting custom and usage." Phelan v. Cook Cnty., 463 F.3d 773, 789 (7th Cir. 2008) (a "widespread practice" argument "would focus on the application of the policy to many different individuals"). Evidence of a series of incidents permits the inference that "there is a true municipal policy at issue," and allows the factfinder "to understand what the omission means." Calhoun, 408 F.3d at 380. By presenting a series of incidents where "the same problem has arisen many times and the [government entity] has acquiesced in the outcome," a plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence that the lack of policy is in fact a de facto policy choice, not a discrete omission. Id. However, "[w]ithout evidence that a series of incidents brought the risk at issue to the attention of the policymaker, we cannot infer that the lack of a policy is the result of deliberate indifference." Hahn, 762 F.3d at 637-38 (citing Calhoun, 408 F.3d at 380). Glisson v. Indiana Department of Corrections, (7th Cir. 2016).
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services holds that, as a rule, "a State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause." 489 U.S. 189, 197, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). . . . [D]ue process "generally confer[s] no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual." Id. Doe v. Village of Arlington Heights, 782 F. 3d 911 (7th Cir. 2015).
However, there are two exceptions to DeShaney's general rule (1) when the state has a "'special relationship'" with the person such as "when it has custody over a person, it must protect him because no alternate avenues of aid exist," and (2) under the state-created danger exception, "'liability exists when the state affirmatively places a particular individual in a position of danger the individual would not otherwise have faced.'" Buchanan-Moore v. Cnty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir.2009) (quoting Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir.1998)); see also Slade v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Milwaukee, 702 F.3d 1027, 1030 (7th Cir.2012) (discussing two exceptions as the "special relationship" and "trap" cases and stating that "[a]ll acts are affirmative, including standing still when one could save a person by warning him of some impending danger"). Doe v. Village of Arlington Heights, ibid.
"Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that generally shields government officials from suit under § 1983 for their discretionary actions." Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 685 (6th Cir.2005). To overcome that defense, a plaintiff must show that, when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to him, (1) the defendant deprived him of a constitutionally protected right, and (2) the right was "clearly established" at the time of the violation. Morrison v. Bd. of Trustees of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir.2009). "Courts may [ ] address these prongs in either order; indeed one may be dispositive." Austin v. Redford Twp. Police Dep't, 690 F.3d 490, 496 (6th Cir.2012). "If either one is not satisfied, qualified immunity will shield the officer from civil damages." Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir.2013). Gradisher v. City of Akron, 794 F. 3d 574 (6th Cir. 2015).
Unlike a denial of summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds, a denial of summary judgment on municipal-liability grounds does not fall under the collateral-order doctrine. Although the doctrine's first two requirements would be satisfied—the denial is conclusive and review of it would not affect any other issue in the case—the City would not be able to satisfy the third requirement because [a] court could review the question of municipal liability after the district court rendered a final judgment. See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546; see also Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 467-68. Brown v. Chapman, (6th Cir. 2016).
On an interlocutory appeal, when a municipality's right to summary judgment is "inextricably intertwined" with a qualified-immunity analysis, a court may exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the municipality's appeal. Mattox v. City of Forest Park, 183 F.3d 515, 523-24 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 50-51 (1995). "[A] pendent appellate claim [is] inextricably intertwined with a properly reviewable claim on collateral appeal only if the pendent claim is coterminous with, or subsumed in, the claim before the court on interlocutory appeal"—in other words "when the appellate resolution of the collateral appeal necessarily resolves the pendent claim as well." Mattox, 183 F.3d at 524 (quoting Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 930 (10th Cir. 1995)). Brown v. Chapman, ibid.
THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of 199 U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze and discuss municipal liability under 42 USC Section 1983 pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services. The selection of decisions spans from 2004 to the date of publication.