Bell, a staff radiologic technologist, worked with doctors at Baptist Health. Between March and November 2019, Bell documented several incidents involving Dr. Yadav, alleging differential treatment towards her compared to male coworkers. See Bell v. Baptist Health, 60 F. 4th 1198 (8th Cir. 2023). Bell reported these incidents to Baptist Health and later filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complaint. Baptist Health implemented a safety plan and placed her on paid administrative leave after an unrelated incident with another doctor.
Bell sued Baptist Health and Dr. Yadav after Baptist Health proposed that she transfer to a different location or department. Her suit included claims for sex discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment and constructive discharge.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Baptist Health on all of Bell's claims. On appeal, the Eight Circuit reviews de novo Bell's claims of constructive discharge, sex-discrimination and retaliation.
Affirmed — Bell did not experience an adverse employment action because Baptist Health offered reasonable solutions to prevent future negative interactions with Dr. Yadav. Bell's hostile work environment claim is not actionable because she did not present any evidence beyond her own allegations.
A.
First, we address Bell's constructive discharge claim. "Title VII encompasses employer liability for a constructive discharge." Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 143, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 159 L.Ed.2d 204 (2004). To establish a claim of constructive discharge, Bell must show that "(1) a reasonable person in her situation would find the working conditions intolerable, and (2) the employer intended to force her to quit. An employee must, however, grant her employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the intolerable condition before she terminates her employment." Rester v. Stephens Media, LLC, 739 F.3d 1127, 1132 (8th Cir. 2014). The bar to show constructive discharge is high. O'Brien v. Dep't of Agric., 532 F.3d 805, 810-11 (8th Cir. 2008). Here, Bell presented no evidence that Baptist Health intended to force her to quit. Rather, the record indicates that Baptist Health tried to retain Bell by giving her paid administrative leave, offering to relocate her to a different location, and offering to transfer her to a new department. Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Baptist Health on this claim.
B.
Second, we address Bell's sex-discrimination and retaliation claims. These claims both fail for the same reason: there is no genuine dispute of material fact about whether Bell suffered an adverse employment action.
Bell alleges sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the ACRA, Ark. Code § 16-123-101 et seq. The analysis is the same under both statutes. See Barber v. C1 Truck Driver Training, LLC, 656 F.3d 782, 792 (8th Cir. 2011) (addressing sex discrimination); Burkhart v. American Railcar Indus., Inc., 603 F.3d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 2010) (addressing retaliation). The McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to both her sex-discrimination and retaliation claims because she does not offer direct evidence of either. See Bearden v. Int'l Paper Co., 529 F.3d 828, 831 (8th Cir. 2008); Gibson v. Concrete Equip. Co., 960 F.3d 1057, 1064 (8th Cir. 2020) (noting that the McDonnell-Douglas framework applies to retaliation claims based on indirect evidence). To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, Bell "must show that (1) she was a member of the protected group; (2) she was qualified to perform the job; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) circumstances permit an inference of discrimination." See Bearden, 529 F.3d at 831. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Bell must show "that (1) she engaged in protected conduct; (2) she suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse action was causally linked to the protected conduct." See Jackman v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Dep't of Corr. Servs., 728 F.3d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 2013).
A materially adverse employment action "is a tangible change in working conditions that produces a material employment disadvantage." Rester, 739 F.3d at 1131. "Such action might include termination, cuts in pay or benefits, and changes that affect an employee's future career prospects but minor changes are not enough." Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The focus is on "material adversity" so we can "separate significant from trivial harms." Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006) (emphasis omitted). "In the retaliation context, a materially adverse action is one that might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." Jackman, 728 F.3d at 804-05 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Bell's sex-discrimination and retaliation claims fail because she has not suffered an adverse employment action. Baptist Health offered for Bell to keep her same job at any one of three locations or to transfer departments. Even if it is possible that Bell would have to work periodically with Dr. Yadav if she worked at other locations, she could have transferred to another department where she would not have to work with Dr. Yadav. Bell has not shown that transferring to another department would produce a material employment disadvantage. See Rester, 739 F.3d at 1131. Finally, for her retaliation claim, there is no evidence that the offer to keep her same job at either of the three locations or to transfer to another department would have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. See Jackman, 728 F.3d at 804-05. Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Baptist Health on this claim.
C.
Third, we address Bell's claim of a hostile work environment. Sex discrimination that creates a hostile work environment or abusive work environment violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Vajdl v. Mesabi Acad. of KidsPeace, Inc., 484 F.3d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 2007). "A hostile work environment arises when sexual conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." Id. at 550 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Hostile work environment claims are limited in nature, requiring a high evidentiary showing that the plaintiff's workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "To establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that she was a member of a protected group; (2) the occurrence of unwelcome harassment; (3) a causal nexus between the harassment and her membership in the protected group; (4) that the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and effective remedial action." Id.
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Baptist Health on this claim because there is no evidence that the alleged discrimination by Dr. Yadav was based on sex. We have previously held that there was no genuine dispute of material fact about whether alleged harassment was based on sex when the plaintiff failed to present evidence of the offender's motivation. See Linville v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 335 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("While Farnham's striking Linville in the scrotum and laughing was probative of crude, gender-specific vulgarity, it was not, by itself, probative of gender discrimination."). Here, Bell alleges six incidents with Dr. Yadav between March and November 2019, and she admits that Dr. Yadav made no sexual remarks. Nonetheless, Bell alleges that Dr. Yadav's comments were motivated by sex because he treated women worse than men. But Bell provides no evidence besides her own allegations that Dr. Yadav treated women worse than men. For example, she did not provide testimony or formal complaints from female coworkers alleging that they were similarly treated badly by Dr. Yadav. Though she claims that a male coworker once commented on how Dr. Yadav treats women worse than men, her allegation is inadmissible hearsay that we cannot consider at summary judgment, see Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 377 F.3d 917, 923-24 (8th Cir. 2004), and her male coworker did not substantiate her claim in his deposition. Thus, no reasonable jury could conclude that Dr. Yadav's actions towards Bell were based on her sex. See Palesch v. Mo. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 233 F.3d 560, 567 (8th Cir. 2000) (granting summary judgment to the defendant because the plaintiff presented no evidence besides her allegations that she was harassed because of her race or sex).
THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze and discuss the elements of a Title VII prima facie case. Volume 1 of the casebook covers the District of Columbia Circuit and the First through the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Volume 2 of the casebook covers the Sixth through the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.